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I find it curious that the Weimar Republic was and is often blamed for the oppressive terms of the Versailles Treaty (and thus the widespread unrest and humiliation that set the stage for Hitler), while the the First German Republic was in fact responsible for Germany’s involvement and strategies during World War One. As Fritzsche points out, it’s even debateable whether or not the terms of the Treaty were a main cause of Germany’s economical and political collapse. Continued military involvement and wartime borrowing during WWI devastated Germany’s economy before the terms of the treaty were drawn; the reparations required by the War Guilt Clause (£6,600 million) were small potatoes compared to the money used to finance the German army. Germany lacked the resources to stay in the war as long as they did, and was able to extend their involvement by years through borrowing from banks – a move that had already left them deeply in debt before the close of the war. Before the depression, Chancellor of Germany Gustav Stresemann was able to greatly ameliorate the inflation problem by using foreign loans to fund national development and pay off war reparations. It was only a matter of time, however, before the fiscal irresponsibility of the preceding government caught up with Germany, and theGreat Depression hit the nation especially hard despite Stresemann’s successful efforts to help the economy. It’s true that the Weimar Republic is the government that had a hand in drawing up the Versailles Treaty, but Germany was ultimately one of the losing parties in the war, and the new Weimar Republic had to accept resposibility for the decisions made by their predecessors. It’s interesting that so much blame was placed upon the Weimar Government for the failure of the German economy, while the wartime government had made the collapse almost inevitable.

The Weimar Republic, which has been generally been remembered by historians as a political failure (and by many as the precursor to Nazi Germany), was plagued by hyperinflation, strikes, violence and political instability. How, then, did German culture manage to thrive under such conditions? This question has been nagging at me since we talked about Weimar society on Friday. One of my sources for the research paper (Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic by Sheri Berman) provides different theories regarding this particular problem, and I was able to read over a few of the chapters to gain a better understanding of the disparities between Weimar politics and culture.
As we discussed in class, an experimental, creative culture based in science and rationality arose during the period between the two world wars; movements in art and architecture (Bauhaus, Expressionism, etc.) broke artistic ground, and associational life (clubs, volunteer organizations) flourished, so much that German contemporaries joked that “whenever three or more Germans gathered, they were likely to draw up by-laws and form an association” (Berman, 407). This was during a time when hyperinflation was leaving many with their savings depleted and weak governmental institutions were giving way to political extremism – while it seems that other societies enjoyed fairly stable economies and political systems when associational life was on the rise in the 19th and 20th centuries (Britain comes to mind), Weimar culture was able to flourish in a time of political and economic turmoil. According to Berman, some theorists argue that the political situation was in fact the reason for Weimar culture’s success; fragmentation in government led to a steep decline in mass politics, which had previously provided an outlet for Germans to unite and get have some sort of agency in their government. With this outlet no longer available, Germans instead turned to clubs and associations, a shift which only served to further Germany’s political deterioration. I find this theory convincing, but I need to read on before I form any conclusions of my own.