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Perhaps I'm naive, or my previous education regarding post World War Two Germany was incomplete, but until last week I was completely unaware of the anti-fraternization movement, much less that the rape of German women by American soldiers was a widespread problem. The degree to which German society went to punish those women who "fraternized" with American soldiers (beatings, hair-cutting) was appalling; as Biddiscome points out, it's easy to evoke feminist rhetoric and characterize such behavior as the objectification and perceived ownership of women, especially when placed alongside the metaphor of women taken by the American troops  as the spoils of war. 

I think a more convincing explanation for this sort of vigilante violence toward women, however, lies in the rapidly changing roles of women over the course of the 1920s-40s, and the unfamiliarity of these newly established gender roles to the returning German soldiers. Not only had women filled new jobs and roles in society in the absence of Germany's men during World War Two; studies also showed that the Post-war German woman was in fact more assertive and self-reliant than their male counterparts. The insecurities of the returning soldiers (especially in the presence of healthy soldiers from the world's richest country) led to a widespread distrust and resentment of women - German men tried to push women out of their jobs, accused them of "deserving" rape, and even beat them or forcibly cut their hair as punishment for their sexual and social "transgressions". I realize that the American soldiers occupying Germany were in a position of power over the German men, but I'm surprised that more of the latter's aggression wasn't taken out on the former. What did German men have to gain in so alienating their fellow female citizens?

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I find it curious that the Weimar Republic was and is often blamed for the oppressive terms of the Versailles Treaty (and thus the widespread unrest and humiliation that set the stage for Hitler), while the the First German Republic was in fact responsible for Germany’s involvement and strategies during World War One. As Fritzsche points out, it’s even debateable whether or not the terms of the Treaty were a main cause of Germany’s economical and political collapse. Continued military involvement and wartime borrowing during WWI devastated Germany’s economy before the terms of the treaty were drawn; the reparations required by the War Guilt Clause (£6,600 million) were small potatoes compared to the money used to finance the German army. Germany lacked the resources to stay in the war as long as they did, and was able to extend their involvement by years through borrowing from banks – a move that had already left them deeply in debt before the close of the war. Before the depression, Chancellor of Germany Gustav Stresemann was able to greatly ameliorate the inflation problem by using foreign loans to fund national development and pay off war reparations. It was only a matter of time, however, before the fiscal irresponsibility of the preceding government caught up with Germany, and theGreat Depression hit the nation especially hard despite Stresemann’s successful efforts to help the economy. It’s true that the Weimar Republic is the government that had a hand in drawing up the Versailles Treaty, but Germany was ultimately one of the losing parties in the war, and the new Weimar Republic had to accept resposibility for the decisions made by their predecessors. It’s interesting that so much blame was placed upon the Weimar Government for the failure of the German economy, while the wartime government had made the collapse almost inevitable.

The Weimar Republic, which has been generally been remembered by historians as a political failure (and by many as the precursor to Nazi Germany), was plagued by hyperinflation, strikes, violence and political instability. How, then, did German culture manage to thrive under such conditions? This question has been nagging at me since we talked about Weimar society on Friday. One of my sources for the research paper (Civil Society and the Collapse of the Weimar Republic by Sheri Berman) provides different theories regarding this particular problem, and I was able to read over a few of the chapters to gain a better understanding of the disparities between Weimar politics and culture.
As we discussed in class, an experimental, creative culture based in science and rationality arose during the period between the two world wars; movements in art and architecture (Bauhaus, Expressionism, etc.) broke artistic ground, and associational life (clubs, volunteer organizations) flourished, so much that German contemporaries joked that “whenever three or more Germans gathered, they were likely to draw up by-laws and form an association” (Berman, 407). This was during a time when hyperinflation was leaving many with their savings depleted and weak governmental institutions were giving way to political extremism – while it seems that other societies enjoyed fairly stable economies and political systems when associational life was on the rise in the 19th and 20th centuries (Britain comes to mind), Weimar culture was able to flourish in a time of political and economic turmoil. According to Berman, some theorists argue that the political situation was in fact the reason for Weimar culture’s success; fragmentation in government led to a steep decline in mass politics, which had previously provided an outlet for Germans to unite and get have some sort of agency in their government. With this outlet no longer available, Germans instead turned to clubs and associations, a shift which only served to further Germany’s political deterioration. I find this theory convincing, but I need to read on before I form any conclusions of my own.

Taking History with a Grain of Salt

While going over the different the different ideas concerning the second German Empire and its position in history (preceding the Third Reich and Nazi Germany), I found myself torn between conflicting theories. I found the Bielefeld theory (formulated by Hans-Ulrich Wehler and Jurgen Kocka) to be convincing; it seemed to cover all the bases (social, economic, political) with strong supporting evidence. The main idea the Bielefeld school presents is that of a discontinuity between Germany's modern economy and pre-modern, authoritarian political system. While other countries around Europe were undergoing parliamentarization and democratization, Germany remained a "Bonapartist half-dictatorship" (in the words of Wehler), controlled by Bismarck and the aristocratic elite. The second point they make is that of the bourgeois liberals' failure to push for political "progress" (democratization, parliamentarization). In exchange for a hand in Germany's booming economy (in addition to a number of other concessions provided by Bismarck), Wehler and Kocka suggest that the bourgeoisie compromised their political ideas, and conceded to the conservative aristocracy in the political arena. This idea of Bismarck using carrots to suppress political dissent is reinforced by the Bielefeld's school's third point - that Bismarck diverted Germany's attention from domestic tensions (political and social) by focusing on threats from abroad ("social imperialism")  and among Germany's religious and ethnic minorities ("negative integration"). 

I was pretty much sold on the Bielefeld interpretation of the Second Reich until I read the questions posed by Blackbourn and Eley's theory. Why do historians so often presume that the bourgeoisie were inherently liberal, and the aristocracy inherently conservative?   Why do we hold this period of German history up to a "European" model (exemplified by France, Britain, etc.) and judge it by its LACK of a revolution or democratization? Blackbourn and Eley also accuse the Bielefeld school of a grossly misinterpreting the Second Reich's political scene, and reducing the masses (all non-aristocratic voters) to a passive group to be manipulated by Bismarck and the conservatives.

As Lorenz points out, Blackbourn and Eley's theory asks more questions than it answers, but I found their argument just as convincing as Bielefeld's (especially when supplemented with those of Mittelage and Nipperdey). I found it disconcerting, though, how easily wooed I was by both arguments, despite their stark dissimilarities. I hate to think of myself as a passive reader of history, but after reading Blackbourn and Eley's arguments I felt presumptuous for assuming, alongside Wehler and Kocka, that one's class dictates their political affiliations. Conversely, I felt discouraged that I was so easily swayed by Blackbourn and Eley after reading their argument - but is it really possible to read and interpret history objectively? Would it be more intellectually honest to approach every theory I come across as a skeptic? I don't want to find myself so easily manipulated by well-worded arguments.

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While reading the chapter from German Social Democracy, I found it particularly interesting how the German Social Democrats’ evolving interpretations of Marxism (or as Shorske calls one particular brand on page 2, “Marxian Socialism”) varied so greatly and often strayed so far from those of Marx himself, especially since the original Social Democratic Labor Party was cofounded by one of his disciples. Although Shorske notes that the German Socialists did not become “really receptive” to Marxism until after the Gotha Conference and the ensuing counterattacks from Bismarck, the Gotha Program still claimed ties to Marxism. These claims insulted Marx, who in turn wrote the essay Critique of the Gotha Program.

He found the program to be more Lassalian than Marxian, and criticized its demands (universal suffrage, direct legislation) as hackneyed, “nothing beyond the old democratic litany familiar to all”:

It is as if, among slaves who have at last got behind the secret of slavery and broken out in rebellion, a slave still in thrall to obsolete notions were to inscribe on the program of the rebellion: Slavery must be abolished  because the feeding of slaves in the system of slavery cannot exceed a certain low maximum!

He also accused Lasalle of being an opportunist who was compromising the goals of the movement in exchange for government concession. It seems like Marx was accusing Lasalle and those who drafted the program of essentially “selling out” so that they could have the backing of the very institution they should have been revolting against.

Only after Bismarck’s repression pressured the German Socialists to drop their goal of attaining their goals “by all legal means” did they fully embrace Marx’s ideology; Marxism was considered the “official gospel” of German Social Democracy as outlined in the 1891 Erfurt program. 

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